Saturday, November 12, 2011

positivism and evidence based practice

first posted on Janshs blog Feb 2009

One of my fellow students posed the question: what is Evidence Based Practice and is it the same as positivism?

I have been wrestling with this thought for a couple of days now.

Positivists take the view that knowledge is developed by applying methods from the natural sciences – that is, that it is based on behaviour that is observable rather than on values or reasons. This means that it is based on experimental evidence or (at least) on quantitative analysis.

E891 Educational Enquiry: Study Guide prepared by Martyn Hammersley, pages 18-21:-
EBP movement began in medicine (EBM), using, for example randomized controlled trials (RCTs) which are intended to be easily replicated in other circumstances. However, even in medicine, the EBM approach may well be tempered with experiential evidence. This might also involve observation and interviewing.

So it might be appropriate to say that EBM/EBP may use evidence from a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative data but it must be valid and reliable. For EBP to affect practice, it is likely that generalisability will also be sought, although some (Schofield, 2007, Dellinger and Leech, 2007, Ely et al., 1999) might view this as being less of a necessity, provided that thick descriptions (Geertz, 1973) are used so that the reader can determine the degree of fit with her/his own context.

So I do not think that postivism and EBP equate totally, since there is an opportunity for EBP to draw on qualitative methods.

Dellinger, A. B. and leech, N. L. (2007) ‘Toward a Unified Validation Framework in Mixed Methods Research’ in Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 1, No. 4, 309-332
Ely, M., Vinz, R., Downing, M. and Anzul, M. (1999) ‘On Writing Qualitative Research: Living by Words’. London: Falmer Press
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basicflooks
Hammersley, M. (2007) E891 Study Guide for Open University
Schofield, J. (2007) ‘Increasing the generalizability of qualitative research’ in Hammersley, M. (ed.) Educational research and evidence-based practice. London: Sage

Friday, November 4, 2011

Communities of Practice

Just a few musings of me, ... I'll try to add to this later but I'm late for work!

In a community of practice (I think original idea Lave and Wenger), I would suggest that members share tacit understanding and tacit knowledge (worth looking up Polanyi) which may cross other cultural boundaries. So, for example, teachers in many countries may share similar beliefs about the nature of how people learn, or want to learn. I guess that this could be because of personality traits shared by people who join certain communities but we do also sometimes actually set out to enculturate newcomers - this might be through fairly formal means such as asking them to demonstrate evidence against a set of competences in order to 'qualify' and it can also be less formal through discussion and observation of peers.

I think this may be why #phdchat on twitter has developed as so much more than a professional or social network. There is, perhaps, a community of researchers.

"The concept of the researcher as “bricoleur” or “carpenter of her (sic) own personal theoretical constructs”, is put forward by Ely et al. (1999: 1, 4) who state that it is important to “breathe into our words the life we have experienced”. This is not to say, as Glaser emphatically states (2002: para. 9), that the researcher composes the story on behalf of the interviewees. What it does mean is that writer is attempting to express the experiences of the respondents in a way which is based on tacit, shared understandings that exist between them." (Moreland, 2007: 90)

other related blog posts
stigmergic collaboration
learning theories - is apprenticeship still valid?
The memory of social networks

Further reading
Athannasiou, N. and Nigh, D. (2000) ‘Internationalization, Tacit Knowledge and the Top Management Teams of MNCs’. Journal Of International Business Studies. 31: 47-487

Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) ‘Learning and Pedagogy in Communities of Practice’. In J. Leach and B. Moon (eds.) Learners and Pedagogy. London: Paul Chapman Publishing.

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

phronetic research

Just some stuff I wrote in my thesis (let me know if you want refs)

Human nature is such that it is highly likely that the researcher will bring some personal theories to the start of a grounded theory study, even if these are weakly defined at this stage. Thomas and James (2006: 7) criticise the concept of GT, partly because of this issue of personal experience. Mjøset (2005: 5) is also challenging GT as a methodology. However, he pinpoints an important issue: “Grounded Theory [….] does not aim to generalize to a broader population.” The importance of the GT approach is that the situations being explored are too complex to explain using only a priori theories or hypotheses that might have been formulated before the research was undertaken and based upon generalisations from other situations. The only way that a satisfactory fit can be made between theory and actuality is by generating articulated hypotheses in context as they emerge.


Wright Mills (1959: 6) propounds the idea of a ‘sociological imagination’ to describe the link between the socio-economic background of the phenomenon being investigated and the life history of the participants in the research (the respondents and the researcher). The underlying aim of Wright Mills’ concept of the sociological imagination was to contribute to the discussion about the validity of social sciences at a time when the natural sciences were still much more highly thought of.

Anfara and Mertz (2006: xiv) cite Silver (1983) as defining theory as “a unique way of perceiving reality” leading not only to a deeper insight but also to a “fresh and different perception of an aspect of the world”.
The tacit understanding that I have as an insider researcher, coupled with the richness of the data, and alongside my approach to GT/situational analysis gives me just this kind of profound insight and leads to emergent grounded theory. Although Anfara and Mertz present a linear relationship from concepts/events to constructs (“clusters of thoughts”) to propositions (or “expressions of relationships among several constructs”) to theory ( “a ‘set’ of propositions”), the process is probably nested or looped, since the researcher may move backwards and forwards between concepts, constructs and propositions before any kind of substantive theory emerges. Even then, the emerging theory may drive the analysis back to the very beginning and start off a new loop. For Anfara and Mertz (ibid: xvii) a theory is useful if it “tells an enlightening story […] that gives new insights and broadens your understanding”.

Anfara and Mertz (ibid: xxii-xxiii) cite Cresswell (1994: 86), stating that, for him, ethnography or phenomenology involves starting with a framework whereas in grounded theory the data collection and analysis takes place before “using theory”. This is something of an oversimplification of the situation and indicates a clear cut dichotomy on theoretical stances.
Figure 3.1 (overleaf) lists Cresswell’s five ‘research traditions’ of qualitative research, along with his paradigmatic assumptions and ideological perspectives, as referred to by Anfara and Mertz (2006: xxii – xxiii).

For example, I could take 1, 2, 3, and 4 from figure 3.1, map them on to a, b, and c, and ‘underpin’ them with all of the ideological perspectives listed. This would lead to my use of narrative transcripts with my own ontology/epistemology/methodology clearly determining the constructs and propositions that I develop. My ideological perspective is such a mixture of those stated above that it would be difficult to divorce them from my whole conceptual framework.

figure 3.1 – Cresswell’s guide to a research study design



Anfara and Mertz do go on (ibid: xxiii, xxiv) to consider the work of Merriam (1998), who indicates the ways in which our framework as researchers is linked to a particular literature base and disciplinary orientation – making the whole process ‘theory laden’. They also (ibid: xxv) refer to the work of Mills (1993: 103, 144) who defined theory as an ‘analytical and interpretive framework’ which is for helping the researcher to make sense of a situation. Mills, as reported by Anfara and Mertz, perceives that there are both implicit and explicit theories “underlying” any investigation – even when a theory is “purported to be emergent”, the study will have been framed by beliefs and initial propositions.
As Anfara and Mertz write (ibid: xvii), it is the “diversity and richness” of these initial analytical frameworks that encourage researchers to “see in new and different ways what seems to be ordinary and familiar”.
Flyvbjerg (2001) takes a different view of the role of the social sciences in being able to generate theory. He asserts that there is little point in trying to generate empirical theories, such as in the natural sciences, since the very matter being subjected to investigation cannot be suitable for that approach. He bases his work on the Aristotelian division of knowledge into episteme (scientific, know why, irrefutable), techne (craft, know how) and phronesis (ethics, values, variable, context dependent). If we are investigating what is basically a value-laden human phenomenon, Flyvbjerg suggests that we should take a phronetic approach to our methodology. In such methodology, he suggests we ask the following questions (2001: 60):

1. Where are we going?

2. Is this desirable?

3. What should be done?

4. Who gains and who loses; by which mechanisms of power?

As he states, this means that there is an implicit investigation of values but he denies that this lays the approach open to criticisms of relativism since (ibid: 132) a “focus on relations of values and power” leads to interest from others than the researcher. These others will evaluate the research themselves so the phronetic researcher must deliberately assimilate the context and learn from it – without ‘going native’.

Henstrand (2006: 16) actually embraces the idea of ‘going native’, stating that “proponents of ethnomethodology” actively encourage the researcher to become involved with the group being studied in order to “understand the contextual meanings and avoid distorting the vision of the world” – here she cites Adler and Adler (1987: 32); “going native is the solution rather than the problem”.

On the topic of the richness of data and how this can lead, if not to a simple theory, then certainly to a clearer understanding of the situation, Flyvbjerg (ibid: 133) says that phronetic researchers must begin by asking “little questions” and, with patience and attention to detail, focus on Geertz’s (1973) “thick description”. Flyvbjerg would probably agree with Wright Mills: the problem with Grand Theories is that they are too general to ever be empirically observable.

Grounded theory in contemporary studies makes use of a rich array of data, building in an assimilation of contextual partiality. This potent combination allows the researcher to use the joint processes of data collection, literature search and content analysis to probe deeply into relationships and power interactions. The emerging themes and substantive hypotheses which are formed can then be used to continually develop the investigative area.